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Plaintiff, Chairman of the Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning
Gomrnlsaioa, was indicted by a Grand Jury on two .counts of soliciting
m b r i b e and two counta of accepting a bribe; all a r t felonies*

Plaintiff

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the illegality of
his'constructive restraint* The trial court dismissed the action on the
ground the complaint failed to state a ctainn upon which relief could he
granted* Plaintiff appeals*, We should *eversp,iti part*
Prior to filing the complaint, plaintiff filed four motions
seeking* I) Verbatim copies of transcripts of testimony of all wit*
messes who appeared before the grand jury relative to the indietmettt, t)
The.-Hansen, addressee, and telephone numbers of all persons interviewed
by the grand Jury to determine both Inculpatory and exculpatory evidence,
3) Depositions of all persons deemed neceasary for adequate preparation
of his defense to the indictment, and 4) A preliminary examination before
trial on the indictment*
The t r i a l court denied n a t i o n s 3} and 4); motion Z) was granted
oiily insofar as to the®e witnesses whom the state would call at the trial*
In regard to motion 1), plaintiff was denied verbatim copies of testimony
of any witnessesDigitized
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indictment g test* 1M w i a permttted to read ilie traaeeript of HMiiimonf
of the three w i t n e s s e s whose names were endorsed on the indictment.
Its w a s denied the Tightto-'**&*-^ r t a t t a a n e t e * t^neerninji tite testimony
of t h e s e three witaa©#»##*

/

Thereafter* plaintiff filed the instant petition on the ground the
trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed; iwfrcanse t h e r e was -90 p M I «
can** for the indictment, and his restraint was im violation of due p r o c e s s
and e i p a l protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions*
W i should rule that pl^iatiff could mim

the i s s u e s im a habeas

corpus proceeding; he i s entitled ton preliminary hearing; he should be
able to take depositions, except for members of the grand jury* Thm
trial court did not err in limiting the names and a d d r e s s e s of w i t n e s s e s
to be revealed to plaintiff.

Plaintiff should be permitted to make a v e r -

batim copy only of the testimony of the w i t n e s s e s whose names w e r e
endorsed upon the indictment a s witnesses*
Did plaintiff state a cause of melton opoa which relief may be
granted? t think so* The state vigorously o r g e s plaintiff is not entitled
toa writ of Habeas cor punt because he is not restrained of his liberty**
he i s free on his own recognizance*
Rule 6SB(a)« URCP # provides,
* * * Where no plain, speedy end adequate remedy e x i s t s , relief
may he obtained by appropriate action under- t h e s e r u l e s , on
any one of the f rounds set forth in subdivisions (b) and (f) of
the rule.
Plaintiff has proceeded under Rule 65B{£)t tIRCP*
Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings shall
Digitized
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Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
be granted
whenever
to the
proper
court
that any
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In the case of tm re Smiley 1 iba l*mm before the mmt waa whether
the remedy of habeas corpus was available to ome who wa# at liberty tm
his mm recogaisance* The cotart observed that the nee of habeas coirgKia had
not been restricted to siioatioaa in which the applicant was in Actual
physical custody, but had beett involved ta relieve a wide varl«ty of *HwMr
restraints on a mat*** iibariy. Both ball and a releate om one 1 * ^wa
recognizance are davices to assure one will attest court when his g*re~
eence is required, and there are meaningful sanctions to assure such
agreement is fulfilled.

The court held inch aa individual is not free

to go where he will, for he to subject to restraints not shared by the
public generally; ami, therefore, he is aader sufficient constructive
2
custody to permit him to invoke the writ*
In this jurisdiction* the writ of habeas corpus is used to protect
one who is restrained of his liberty where there exists no jurisdiction
or authority* or where the requirement* of the law have been ao ignored
or distorted the party is substantially and effectively denied what la
included in the term due process of law. Also* where some othar circumstance exists that it would be wholly unconscionable not to re*
examine the conviction* 3 There Is also authority* in this jurisdiction,
that mm accused who, in fact* is denied a preliminary examination and
did act waive this right la entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, *
Plaintiff states the trial court erred in dismissing his claim*
1. 66 Cal. 2d 696* 58 Cat. Eptr* 57^* 427 P*2d 179 0967)*
2* Also see Franklin v» State* Nev*, Si 3 P*2d 1252 (1973); Jacobsoat
v. State* Nov** 510 P.2d 856 (If73); Henaley v* Municipal Conrt* San
Jose Mllpitas Judicial district* 411 0*S. 345* 36 L*Ed. 2d 294* 93 S. CU
157! (1973). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may contain errors.
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because t b t f 0 w a f a genuine Isane a* to whether there was probable
cause to return the indictment*

He argues a court lack* jurisdiction

to proceed to a criminal trial, until probable cause has bee a determined
to **i#t« Ift addltlon>that stich c i w r t be ascertained without reviewing
tlw testimony of those w i t n e s s e s whose names w e r # endorsed on this
indictment.
There a r e two basic issuer he*a«

la an indictee entitled to a

determination of whether there ia probable cause to support the Indictmeat,

If s o , by what procedure Is. tbls standard ascertained*
Since I f 12, Nevada bas utilised habeas corpus to determine

the l e g a l sufficiency of evidence supporting a grand Jury indictment*
The rationale here is the unfairness of requiring one to stand trial
unless probable cause e x i s t s to justify anch a irar-qa^azxiaM*' "The
court permits an inquiry a s io whetiter amy snbat^ttiHat evidence exists
which, II tri**# would aitfpsort a verdict of conviction; for If there be
noma* the grand jury baa exceeded ita powers* and the indictment i s
5
wld«

4
In Shelby v* .Sixth Judicial .District Courts

the court cited

stati§i*iry proviaioaa substantially similar to Section 77-19*3 and 7?~I9~5#
11. Cm A.

$

19S3*. and stated that claimant w a s entitled to a pretrial

inspection of the testimony of the w i t n e s s e s who appeared before the
grand jury * The court out then Intelligently determine whether the
hind and quality of evidence contemplated by the coil* w a s In fact
{MPod^ced heiore. the grand jnryj and whether the Indicted defendant
should be held fort******
S* Shelby v* 'Sixth Judicial. District Comtt$ 02 Hev* £04, 214 P*2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 77-19-3* U. C* A* H53* as amended 19&7* provide*:
la the investigation of a chaige for the purpose of indie*mmmk the grand jury must receive no other evidence than such
as shall be given by witnesses produced and sworn before
them orfurnished by legal documentary evidence o r deposition
of a witness a s provided in Section 77-1-8 • • » The grand
Jtsry m^at receive none bat legal evidence* &®& the beet
evidence in degree* to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary
evidence.
Section 77-19-5, U* CU A. 1953* provides*
The grand jnry ought to find an indictment when all the
evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained o r
uncontradicted, wo^ald in their judgment warrant a conviction by a trial jury*
In light of the foregoing statutes, there shonld be a legal procedure
to determine whether the kind and quality of evidence r e h i r e d was pro*
duced before the grand jury* and whether there was probable canse to
hold the accused to stand trial* Plaintiff nrges that he be granted a
preliminary examination as provided in Chapter 15, Title 77, This
procedure would give defendant an opportunity to be present and to
produce and examine witnesses* Section 77-15-11* for the grand jnry
is not bonnd to hear evidence for the defendant* Section 77*19~4«»
Article I, Section 13* Constitution of Utah* provides!
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by Indict*
menf, shall be prosecuted by information after examination*
unless the examination be waived by the aeen#®d with the
consent of the State* or by indictment* with or wlthont snch
examination and commitment* The formation of the grand
jnry and the powers and duties thereof shall be a s prescribed
by the Legislature*
Section 77*1-4* 0 # C* A. 1953* provides:
Every public offense mnst be prosecuted by information
after examination and commitment by a magistrate unless
the examination
is waived
accused
with
the BYU.
consent
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of the state, or by indictment, with or witbont snch exami-
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When the defendant ia brought before tbtt-«ittkgi«trtt-Hi opom
an mrvrnnt* either with o r without a war ram, on a charge
of having committed a public offense triable on information
or indictment, the magistrate fn^uit immediately inform him
of ill* charge against him and of hia right to the aid of counsel
in e v e r y e t a g e of the proeeediaga*
Section 7 7 - 1 ^ 3 , p r o v i d e s *

At the time set for the hearing t h e m a g i s t r a t e before
whom the accused is brought moat • » v proceed to examine
the case*
Section 77~lS-!7, providest
If after hear log the proofa it appears that either no
public offense has been committed, or that there is not
sufficient cause to believe the defendant gnilty of a public
offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be
discharged, by an indorsement am the warrant or the com*
plaint signed by him* to the following effect! *There being
no sufficient earn** to believe the within named A B guilty
of the offense within mentioned, I order him discharged.'
Section 7 7 - 1 6 - 2 * provides?

Mo defect or irregularity in or want ©r absence of any
proceeding or statutory reqnlremeot, prior to the filing of
an infarinattoii or indictment, including the preliminary
*•**»«!* •*»** constitute prejudicial e r r o r and the defendant .
shall be conclusively presumed to have waited any stich
defect* irregularity, want or absence of proceeding or
statutory requirement, unless he shall before pleading to
••.v. the iMormatlon o r indictment specifically and expressly
object to the information or indictment on such ground.
A review of the constitutional and statutory provisions reveals
there la no eapres* prohibition, denying one indicted a preliminary
examination. By Section 77-16-2, he is conclusively presumed to have
waived any objection to an indictment which was based on evidence not
commensurate with the statutory reqsiiremeata of Section 7 7 - I f * 3 ,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The apparent n^atting of the provialone allowing prosecution to
proceed by ImdietmsBt with or wlthont examination la the one Indicted
baa the option to request such an examination. It is distinguishable
from the right accorded an accused proeeciited by Informatloii* because
In the latter situation an examination must be belli *»leaa a waiver la
established.

Where prosectition la begun by indictment, the arcnaed

mtiat take affirmative action t& be accorded thia right*
Plaintiff eiated a claim upon which relief conld be granted, vls»
a denial of a preliminary examination 7 ~~ be wae entitled to tMe pro**
cediire#

.•
Plaintiff further contends he la entitled to a verbatim tranacrlpt

of all grand jury witneeaea* Thia demand la not In accord with Section
7?~%y~% U# C* A«> 1953, aa amended I9?t# the relevant portlona elates
* * » It ehait he the duty of auch stenographic reporter to
report In shorthand the teatimony that may be given before
the grand jury and, where an Indictment la returned, to
transcribe the jhiaHtm&y of the defendant o r defendants
and all witnesses whose aamee a r e inserted or endorsed
upon the indictment aa witnesses # * •

y
V

V,,

^

To limit the disclosure of the teatimony of the wltneeaea before
the grand jury, to those whose names a r e endoraed on the indictment la
in consonance with the aforecited statute, Snch alee atrlkea a proper
?."11 wtnnovtch v* F-mery# Note 4# supra,
3» Plaintiff haa cited the concurring opinion of Justice Moak In Johnaon
v* Superior Conrt of San Joaqnin, 15 CaL 3d 24S# 124 Cah Rptr* 32* 539
P*2d 792 (I9T5)# wherein It la clearly pointed out that the intrinsic conetltntlonal infirmity In the grand jnry*a Indicting function can be cared only
by allowing every indicted defendant a poat~ indictment preliminary hearing
aa a matter of right. Specifically, If an Indictee is not accorded the right
to demand a preliminary hearing he la denied due process at a critical
stage of the proceedings. There ia alao a violation of equal protection
when an Indictee is not accorded the rights granted to an individual p r o secuted by information*
However, since Utah law appeara to grant aa
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
indictee, at his option* a preliminary
examination,
Machine-generated OCR,
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aett»mm*datto«^. between the essential secret nature of the grand jury
proceedings, aad the right of oiie Indict**! to dstermtoe there was com*
pllauce with the eYideutiary standards set forth iu 77*19<-3«
la State *• Fanx:^ the issue before this court w&i th* appropriate
time at which defease counsel should be .permitted to'exemlee the trees**
cript for purposes of impeaehmeot of witnesses at th* trial* T h e erldeetlary
standard of Seettoa ?7~l?-3 was neither put in issue eor discussed; however*
the statement of Justice Crockett ie the majority opinion la applicable
herein*
* # # If anyone la under the illusion that in this country one
may he coi^Jeitimed for alleged crime upon evidence taken
in hts abseece aud kept secret from him, It i s hearteoiiig
t#
to he able to point out that such is ttet the stele' of our law* • .
Without disclosure of th* testimony of the witnesses endorsed eat
the ladi€tme^t# there is mo 0iher way for one indicted to determine
whether there was adherence to the statutory evideutiary standard of
?f^lf*3 # prior to his plea* Bear to mind, any objection thereto 1* walked
tiN*reaft^^
Plaintiff finally urges he should he permitted to take depositions,
and that State *• Nlelsea

should be overruled* With this contention, I

am in complete agreement, A defead&ot la a crimlual actioa should he
permitted to take depositions; however» he must proceed in compliance
with the provisions of Sections 77-19*10 and 77-1 f - t l t U# C. A* 1*53,
wherein a grand juror may not be examined except for the limited
ii» i iiirtniw imiiNiiHiiiliii mini

•
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% 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P. 2d 186 (1959).
L0, At p. 355 ol 9 Utah 2d.'
11, Utah, 522 P.2d
1366 <J9?4i.
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exception set forth*
A s stated by Justice Henriod in his dls aent in State v« G«ert«:
• .# mm- |Kr«ltmfnftry hearings and the right t® tafct depositions
fref&eafly are the sharpest weapons available to co«o#^l In
piercing subsequent testimony by coiifromtatioi* with prior
inconsistent testimony* Such a* opportunity • • « may
make the difference between guilt and innocence in the minds
of the vmmbttm&mm*
(AH emphasis supplied*)
IIII»WII<IIMII>IIIIII w^ l <>» l «i>iMiiiii l iii l < ll | l iii l iWi»»ii'iiiiNi l ii
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